Wrongdoing of cladding makers who rigged tests to sell flammable materials is laid bare

The 72 people who died in London's Grenfell Tower fire in 2017 were failed over decades, "in most cases through incompetence but in some through dishonesty and greed". So says the final report of the official inquiry into the fire, seven years in the making.

So what? The report describes a housing system rotten to the core. It attacks the government, the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea, architects, building contractors, safety inspectors and the London Fire Brigade.

But its harshest criticism is for the makers of the building's cladding. These companies engaged in "systematic dishonesty" and "deliberate and sustained strategies" to

The question: "How was it possible in 21st-century London for a reinforced concrete building, itself structurally impervious to fire... to be turned into a death trap?" the report asks.

The answers are itemised by manufacturer:

Arconic's Reynobond PE 55 aluminium composite material (ACM) panels were the "primary cause" of the fire spreading - highly combustible polyethylene between two thin aluminium skins. Sold in two forms, the cheaper version burned so violently in tests it could not be classified under the European fire safety system.

Celotex's RS5000, the tower's primary insulation material was made from a combustible plastic called polyisocyanurate, which lets off toxic gases including cyanide when it burns.

Kingspan's K15 Kooltherm made up around 5 per cent of Grenfell's insulation. It consisted of combustible foam sold as safe despite a test described in an internal document as a "raging inferno".

Conflicted inspectors. Approved safety inspectors "had a commercial interest in acquiring and retaining customers that conflicted with the performance of their role as guardians of the public interest."

The result. Just before midnight on 14 June 2017, when a fire broke out in a kitchen on the fourth floor, Grenfell Tower was clad in petrochemicals. The toxic gases emitted by the burning materials meant all the fire's victims were dead before the flames reached them.

And not forgetting...

Design & build. Studio E, a now-defunct architectural firm, "bears a very significant degree of responsibility" for the fire. It had no experience of cladding high rise buildings, did not ensure the materials complied with regulations and was chosen for cost reasons. Contractors Rydon and Harley were also more concerned with cost than fire safety.

Government. The Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea and its social housing arm had a "persistent indifference to fire safety, particularly the safety of vulnerable people".

999. London Fire Brigade's "stay put" strategy for Grenfell Tower was designed to avoid panic while firefighters tackled a blaze in a single flat. But...

The buck stops where? In 1991 a serious fire at an 11-storey tower block in Merseyside identified the risk posed by combustible cladding panels and insulation. No government took action. The coalition government's housing department "determinedly resisted calls from across the fire sector to regulate fire risk assessors and to amend the fire safety order".

Justice? Critics of the report have bemoaned the length of time it took, but its detailed breakdown of lies, evasion-cutting and complacency is damning. The Crown Prosecution Service says no charges will be brought before 2026, but yesterday the Speaker of the House of Commons advised MPs to be careful what they said in case of future criminal proceedings.

Meanwhile, Keir Starmer said no company named in the report would be considered for public contracts in the future. Yet in the past five years, companies involved in Grenfell's 2016 refurbishment earned about £250 million in public deals.

What's more... Arconic, Kingspan and Celotex are still in the insulation business, domiciled in the US, Ireland and France respectively.

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